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Abstract— We consider adhoc networks with multiple, mobile
colluding intruders. We investigate the placement of the intrusion
detection modules for misuse intrusion detection. Our goal is
to maximize the detection performance subject to limitation
in the computational resources. We mathematically formulate
different detection objectives, and show that computing the
optimal solution is NP-hard in each case. Thereafter, we propose
a family of algorithms that approximate the optimal solution,
and prove that some of these algorithms have guaranteeable
approximation ratios. The algorithms that have analytically
guaranteeable performance require re-computation every time
the topology changes due to mobility. We next modify the
computation strategy so as to seamlessly adapt to topological
changes due to mobility. Using simulation we evaluate these
algorithms, and identify the appropriate algorithms for different
detection performance and resource consumption tradeoffs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adhoc networks are likely to find large scale applica-
tions in scenarios where infrastructure can not be used for
communication, e.g., disaster recovery, battlefields, homeland
security e.g., monitoring superbowl matches, ensuring secu-
rity for dignitaries etc. For large scale deployment, adhoc
networks must be designed so that the applications can be
used by a large number of users; this introduces significant
security risks. One such risk can be a user who subverts the
functioning of the network by causing undesirable events.
Such users are considered as intruders and the events as
intrusions. Examples of intrusions are denial of service attacks
e.g., TCP SYN flood ∗, smurf †, attacks that use abnormal
packets, e.g., packets with the same source and destination
address, packet fragmentation attacks, e.g., ping of death,
attacks on the authentication mechanisms, bubonic attacks ‡
etc. [7] [6]. Some intrusions can be prevented by designing
resistant protocols e.g., SCTP [23] resists TCP SYN flood
attacks, and techniques like challenge response authentication
mechanisms [2], etc. But, there have been many instances
where intrusions could not be prevented even when these
techniques have been used, since they leveraged vulnerabilities
present in the system. For example, WEP authentication,
which is based on a challenge-response mechanism, fails to
prevent intruders from authenticating themselves even when
the system key is not compromised [18]. Similarly, an intruder
∗Here, an attacker violates the 3 way handshake of TCP and opens a large
number of half-open TCP connections.
†Here, an attacker sends forged ICMP packets to a broadcast address.
‡Here an attacker randomly sends TCP packets (e.g., without waiting for
acknowledgements) with settings which crash the machine.
can use an authentication flaw in windows debugger [1] to log
interactively into another machine and obtain root privileges.
Also, the prevention mechanisms fail when system secrets like
encryption keys are compromised. It is therefore important to
devise mechanisms to recover from intrusion. The first step
towards recovering is to detect intrusion. For example, when
a node detects a malicious packet, it can drop the packet,
and thereby recover from intrusion. We focus on efficiently
detecting intrusions. Both intrusion prevention and recovery,
though important, are beyond the scope of this paper.
Intrusion detection has been extensively investigated for
wireline networks [8], [11]. But techniques geared towards
wireline networks would not suffice in an adhoc network due
to mobility, the ease of listening to wireless transmissions,
lack of fixed infrastructure, etc. [13]. For example, several
detection strategies in wireline networks are based on the
presence of a small number of gateways that route and
therefore monitor all traffic. But, adhoc networks typically
do not have such choke points. Also, intrusion may be
detected in wireline networks by detecting anomaly, i.e., by
comparing the current system behavior with that in absence
of intrusion. In adhoc networks, however, normal behavior
can not be accurately characterized, e.g., a node may transmit
false updates since the routing protocol is slow to converge
and not because it is malicious. Further, unlike in wireline
networks, nodes in an adhoc network have limited energy.
Hence, only computationally simple, energy-efficient detection
strategies can be used. The detection algorithms must also
be distributed as communication with a central computing
unit will consume significant energy. Finally, the detection
algorithms must seamlessly adapt to topological changes due
to mobility. These motivate the design of detection strategies
specifically geared towards adhoc networks.
A strategy specifically suitable for adhoc networks is that
of misuse detection that relies on the use of known patterns
of unauthorized behavior. More specifically, this technique de-
tects intrusion when the transmitted traffic contains abnormal
packets which serve as “signatures” of attacks. For example, a
UDP packet destined to port 0 can crash some machines [7].
The signature of ping-of-death attack is a very large sized ping
packet, that of RPC locator attack is a packet intended for port
135 that contains a command that the system is not expecting,
that of Bubonic attack are various values such as a TTL of 255,
a TOS field value of 0xC9, exactly 20 byte payload in the IP
datagram and the fragment ID value with consistent increments
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of 256 [7]. The appearance of a large number of SYN packets
without the corresponding ACK packets indicate a SYN flood
attack [7]. Due to low false alarm rates, misuse detection is the
mainstay of current commercial intrusion detection systems in
wireline networks and wireless LAN. This technique can not
however detect new attacks, i.e., the attacks whose signatures
are unknown. Nevertheless, it is the most suitable technique in
adhoc networks given that it does not require characterization
of normal behavior.
But a prerequisite for deploying misuse detection in ad-
hoc networks is to determine which nodes should execute
the sniffing and analysis software modules which we refer
to as the intrusion detection system (IDS) modules in the
sequel. We show that different selection strategies can have
significantly different detection performance and execution
costs (Section II). It is therefore crucial to deploy appropriate
selection strategies that attain the desired tradeoff. We math-
ematically formulate the problem of selecting the nodes so
as to minimize the execution cost subject to maximizing the
detection performance (Section III-B). We prove that com-
puting the optimal selection strategy is an NP-hard problem.
Then, we present distributed approximation algorithms that
attain guaranteeable approximation bounds. We also consider
the dual problem of selecting the nodes so as to maximize the
detection performance subject to not consuming more than a
predetermined amount of resource (Section III-C). We show
that this problem is also NP-hard, and outline the design of
distributed approximation algorithms. The algorithms that have
analytically guaranteeable performance require re-computation
every time the topology changes due to mobility. We next
modify the computation strategy so as to seamlessly adapt
to topological changes due to mobility (Section III-D). We
evaluate the proposed algorithms using extensive simulations
(Section IV). In Section V, we describe the relevant literature.
Due to lack of space, we present proofs in a technical report
[24].
The characterization of the optimal selection strategy allows
us to identify the appropriate selection strategy for realizing
desired tradeoffs between the detection efficiency and re-
source consumption. Our investigations reveal that the optimal
strategies consume significantly lower resource in detection as
compared to heuristics when high detection rate is necessary,
and thus must be deployed in this case. But, when the system
can tolerate certain amount of intrusion and therefore the
detection rate can be small, the heuristics and the optimal
selection strategies consume similar resources. Thus heuristics
may be deployed in these scenarios. We also observe that
the optimal selection algorithms detect all malicious packets
by executing the IDS in only a small fraction of the nodes
(typically less than 15%). This is an encouraging outcome as
in most adhoc networks at least a small number of nodes will
have significant energy. Thus, it would be sufficient to execute
the IDS in only these nodes.
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Fig. 1. This figure illustrates the system model. The outsider nodes (Intruder1,
Intruder2) attack the destinations (1,2). The insider nodes are the access points,
mobile terminals and laptops (B, D, E).
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The network consists of two types of nodes: insider nodes
and outsider nodes. Insider nodes, e.g., PDAs, cellphones,
laptops, media servers, location servers etc. perform various
system tasks, e.g., serve as endpoints of the flows, relay
the traffic, auto-configure the system, detect intrusion, etc.
Outsider nodes are the sources of traffic, and may also be
destinations, but do not perform any other system task. A
session originates from an outsider node, traverses insider
nodes and terminates at an insider or another outsider node.
The sessions continuously join and leave the network. A node
may serve as both a source and a destination (of different
sessions) - such a node does not perform any other system task
and is referred to as an outsider as well. An outsider node may
wish to deliver malicious packets to the destination, which may
be an insider or another outsider, resulting in harm to or failure
of the destination node. Hence, an outsider is referred to as an
intruder. There may be multiple intruders who may collude.
Insider nodes execute the IDS so as to detect the malicious
packets while in transit between the intruder and the destina-
tion. We assume that insider nodes are not compromised, i.e.,
there are no insider attacks [4]. Authentication mechanisms
prevent an outsider from pretending to be an insider node.
We now describe some systems that can be described as
above. Consider a UN peacekeeping force whose mandate is
to maintain peace in troubled areas and to provide basic net-
working services such as email, news, entertainment (games,
music) etc. Adhoc networks consisting of small access points
on buildings and mobile terminals carried by the personnel
can be used for the communication (Figure 1). Civilians can
communicate with each other by accessing the network using
devices such as laptops, cell-phones and PDAs which are the
outsider nodes. Some of these outsider nodes will be mali-
cious. The access points and mobile terminals in the network
relay the traffic and perform tasks related to the mission. The
intruders may attack the machines that they deem important for
the mission objectives. The access points, mobile terminals and
the targeted machines are the insider nodes. Since the insider
nodes are controlled by the peacekeeping force, authentication
mechanisms can be implemented to protect communications
0-7803-8797-X/04/$20.00 (C) 2004 IEEE
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amongst these.
A similar example can also be given in the setting of a
university where static and mobile access points are deployed
at various places on campus to allow outsiders (students)
access to various destinations. Here, mobile access points
are those on the vehicles. The destinations can be PDAs in
labs that allow students to contact teaching assistants, lab
personnel, or specialized servers that allow the students to
check their grades, register for courses, participate in class
discussions, etc. The insider nodes consist of the access points
and the destinations (which may also relay traffic for other
flows). Some students may send malicious packets towards
the destinations.
We consider a misuse-based detection strategy. The nodes
that execute the IDS detect malicious packets. Some insider
nodes may not have the capability to execute the IDS. Thus,
insider nodes are of two types: (a) IDS capable and (b) IDS
incapable. Also, different IDS capable insider nodes consume
different amount of resources to execute the IDS. This is
because nodes, e.g., PDAs, laptops, access points etc. have
different residual energy and computational capability. De-
pending on the system policy, some but not all the IDS capable
insider nodes will execute the IDS - these are denoted as
IDS active. The selection of the IDS active nodes will depend
on the available bandwidth, computational resources, energy
and the topology that change with time. We now examine the
tradeoffs associated with different selection strategies.
An obvious IDS placement strategy (host intrusion detection
or HID) [16] for adhoc networks is to execute the IDS at
only the destinations of the sessions, e.g. destinations 1, 2
in figure 1. Here, a node executes the IDS at its application
layer, and can therefore analyze only the packets it receives as
destination, and not those that it relays. The advantage of HID
is that it is not affected by the use of end-to-end cryptography
or by changes in topology and routing that may be triggered
by node mobility. But HID has several serious drawbacks.
First, an intruder can avoid detection and produce maximum
damage by exploiting the knowledge that only the destination
analyzes the packets. For example if the intruder knows that
the destination is using windows 98 operating system, then
it can transmit a packet that crashes the machine as soon
as the destination’s network layer assembles the packet and
before the IDS at the application layer analyzes the packet.
Second, the detection mechanism will use the computation
resources and network interfaces at the end-host. But, an
attack on the target may simultaneously exhaust the resources
available for detecting and reporting such attacks. Third, many
of the destination nodes may not be able to execute the
IDS due to limited computational resource and low residual
energy. Finally, if only the end-hosts execute the IDS, then the
malicious packets would not be dropped until they reach the
destination. Thus several nodes expend their limited energy
and available bandwidth in relaying malicious packets.
The network intrusion detection (NID) technique [16] ex-
ecutes the IDS on some selected insider nodes, e.g., the
access point(2) in figure 1, which may be relays or end-hosts.
Here, a node executes the IDS at its network layer, and can
therefore analyze both the packets it relays and receives as
destination. In adhoc networks, NID has several advantages
over HID. First, an intruder can no longer be certain that
only the destination is executing the IDS. Moreover, the
IDS active nodes can be selected so that they have different
characteristics. Thus, it will be more difficult for the intruders
to devise attacks that are not detected. Second, the IDS active
nodes can be selected only among those that have the required
capability. Third, NID captures malicious packets in transit and
thus limits the wastage of bandwidth and energy in relaying
them. We consider NID in this paper.
The challenge in deploying NID is to appropriately select
the IDS active nodes. A straightforward strategy is to execute
the IDS on every insider node. Thus every malicious packet
will be detected. But this significantly increases the energy
consumption and the computation. On the other hand, if the
IDS are executed in very few nodes, then the resource con-
sumption decreases but some malicious packets may escape
inspection leading to undetected intrusion. The challenge is to
select the IDS active nodes so that the resource consumption is
minimized subject to ensuring that every packet is inspected
at least once by an IDS active node. In wireline networks,
the IDS is executed in choke-points or gateways that relay
all traffic and can therefore capture and analyze all packets.
But, as discussed before, adhoc networks typically do not
have such choke-points. Also, even if such choke-points exist,
their locations continuously change due to mobility. Thus,
designing the optimal selection strategy is more complex in
adhoc networks.
The IDS modules can clearly analyze un-encrypted traffic,
but it is not limited to this case. It can also analyze encrypted
traffic when encryption is not at a layer at which it operates.
For example, when traffic is encrypted at the application layer,
IDS modules can detect attacks at transport and lower layers,
e.g., ping-of-death, TCP SYN flood, smurf, bubonic, etc. If
encryption is used at all layers, e.g., in battlefield networks,
then schemes can be designed to distribute the keys securely to
the IDS active nodes. Investigation of key distribution schemes
is beyond the scope of this paper.
The IDS active nodes may either operate individually or
“cooperate,” i.e., aggregate each others analysis. When acting
individually each such node detects intrusion based only
on the packets that it analyzes. Thus, an intrusion can be
detected only when all the packets that constitute the attack are
analyzed by one IDS active node. Now, individual operation is
sufficient against single packet attacks such as Code Red and
Slammer [7] and multiple packet attacks in which all malicious
packets traverse the same route. But, unless nodes cooperate,
multiple packet attacks e.g., ping of death or teardrop, in
which malicious packets traverse different routes, will not be
detected; different packets may traverse different routes due
to topology changes or the intruder’s route selection [19].
In our technical report, we demonstrate that the detection
rate increases significantly due to this cooperation [24]. We
therefore assume that nodes cooperate. Other authors have
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also assumed cooperation, e.g., [22], [25]. The disadvantage of
cooperation is that it increases the complexity and the resource
consumed in the detection - this is also the case in [22],
[25]. For example, each node has only partial information and
different nodes have different information. Therefore, nodes
must exchange messages and agree whether a packet or a
sequence of packets is malicious. Nevertheless, it is important
to investigate the maximum possible detection assuming full
cooperation among nodes. This is what we focus on. The de-
sign of schemes for achieving complete or partial cooperation
is a topic of future research.
III. INTRUSION DETECTION IN PRESENCE OF RESOURCE
LIMITATION
We first mathematically formulate the system assumptions
and capabilities (subsection III-A). Thereafter, we consider
different detection objectives. Specifically, we consider the
problems of selecting the IDS active nodes so as to: (a)
minimize the resource consumption subject to maximizing the
detection efficiency (subsection III-B), and (b) maximize the
detection efficiency subject to upper bounding the resource
consumption (subsection III-C). We prove that both problems
are NP-hard. In each subsection, we present distributed com-
putation algorithms for approximating the respective optimal
solutions within provable approximation bounds. These al-
gorithms are oblivious to the movement of outsider nodes,
but require re-computation whenever insider nodes move. In
subsection III-D, we present algorithms that do not have
provable approximation bounds, but nevertheless avoid such
re-computations and are therefore more suitable when insider
nodes move rapidly.
A. Mathematical formulation for system assumptions and ca-
pabilities
We represent a wireless network by an undirected graph
G(V,E). Here, V = {1, . . . , N} consists of the insider nodes
and E is the set of edges between the insider nodes. A node
u can receive transmissions from any node v which is within
a distance r from u. There exists an undirected edge between
any two nodes whose distance is r or less.
Definition 1: A neighborhood Ni of an insider node i is
the set of insider nodes that are within distance r from i. An
insider node i covers every node in its neighborhood.
By this definition, an insider node is always its own neighbor
and covers itself.
If an outsider node is within distance r of some insider node,
it can transmit a packet through the network to an insider or
another outsider. It may use any set of paths for transferring its
packets. The number and the locations of the outsider nodes
and their destinations are not known to the network, and vary
with time. An IDS capable insider node i has weight wi that
represents its resource consumption when it executes the IDS.
An IDS active insider node operates in promiscuous mode,
i.e., receives any packet that is transmitted by any of its
neighbors. For example in figure 1, if access point(2) is IDS
active and operates in promiscuous mode, it can analyze the
packets transmitted by nodes A, B, C. Clearly, operation in
promiscuous mode increases the power consumption of these
nodes. But, many other authors also assume similar operation,
e.g. [15],[20]. More importantly, the following observation
shows that such operation actually reduces the overall energy
consumption in the network.
Lemma 1: All malicious packets will be detected if and
only if every insider node satisfies one of the following
properties. (a) It executes the IDS. (b) It is covered by an
IDS active insider node that operates in promiscuous mode.
We explain the consequence of this lemma. Suppose the
system requires 100% detection, i.e., all malicious packets
must be detected. But, only few IDS active nodes operate in
promiscuous mode. Then, a large number of insider nodes will
need to execute the IDS. For example, if none of the IDS active
nodes operate in promiscuous mode, then all insider nodes
must execute the IDS. Our simulations demonstrate that the
algorithms we propose execute the IDS in only a small fraction
of the insider nodes, and thus their operation in promiscuous
mode consume much less energy than executing the IDS in
all insider nodes.
We assume that a path between an outsider node and its
destination always has an intermediate insider node, i.e., we
do not allow direct communication between the source and
the destination. A destination can enforce this assumption by
refusing to accept any packet with MAC layer source address
different from that of an insider node. This assumption has
been motivated by the need for implementing recovery mech-
anisms. For example, if the destination is IDS incapable, which
may happen if it has limited resources, then the destination can
not recover from the attack if it receives a malicious packet
directly from the intruder. Note that the intrusion may still be
detected if the destination is covered by an IDS active insider
node.
B. Selecting the IDS active nodes so as to minimize the
resource consumption subject to maximizing the detection
We assume that the IDS active nodes cooperate. Thus a
malicious packet is detected if it is transmitted by any node
that is covered by an IDS active insider node. Our goal now is
to select the IDS active nodes among the IDS capable nodes
such that they cover the maximum possible number of insider
nodes while minimizing the sum of the weights of the IDS
active insider nodes which is the resource consumed in the
detection.
Definition 2: A dominating set D in G is a set of nodes
such that every node in G is either in D or covered by a node
in D.
If the set of IDS active insider nodes is a dominating set in
G, then any packet transmitted by an insider node is received
by at least one IDS active insider node. Since irrespective of
the position and the number of the sources, destinations and
the paths between them, a packet must be relayed by at least
one insider node, every packet is received by at least one IDS
active insider node. Thus, every malicious packet is analyzed
and hence detected since nodes cooperate. Since some nodes
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Fig. 2. We show example graphs G and G′. The shaded nodes are IDS
incapable. Thus, only v1, v5 may be IDS active. Here, v3 is a removal node,
and hence can not be covered by any IDS active node, and hence can not be
in G′. Now, v1, v5 constitute an IDS capable dominating set in G′.
are IDS incapable, it may not be possible to have the IDS
active nodes constitute a dominating set and therefore cover
all insider nodes. Specifically, IDS active nodes will not cover
the IDS incapable nodes that are not in the neighborhood of
any IDS capable node (Figure 2). In this case, we have to opt
for maximum possible coverage.
Definition 3: An IDS incapable node that is not in the
neighborhood of any IDS capable node is denoted removal
node.
Consider a graph G′ which is obtained by removing the
removal nodes and their edges from G (Figure 2). Thus, the
vertex set in G′, V ′, consists of insider nodes that are covered
by at least one IDS capable insider node.
Lemma 2: The IDS active insider nodes cover the maxi-
mum possible number of nodes in G, if and only if they form
a dominating set in G′.
The lemma follows from the observation that an insider node
can be covered by an IDS active node if and only if it is in
V ′.
Definition 4: An IDS capable dominating set is a domi-
nating set such that its members are IDS capable.
Definition 5: A minimum weighted dominating set is a
dominating set such that the total weight of all its members
is the minimum among all dominating sets.
Definition 6: An IDS capable minimum weighted dominat-
ing set is an IDS capable dominating set with minimum total
weight among all IDS capable dominating sets.
Observation 1: There exists at least one IDS capable dom-
inating set in G′.
Thus there exists an IDS capable minimum weighted dominat-
ing set in G′. By Lemma 2, the optimal set of IDS active nodes
will form an IDS capable minimum weighted dominating set
in G′. So far, we have not considered the weights of the IDS
incapable insider nodes, as an IDS capable minimum weighted
dominating set in G′ will not include them. But, we now show
that by appropriate selection of weights of these nodes, any
IDS capable minimum weighted dominating set in G′ becomes
a minimum weighted dominating set in G′ and vice versa.
Lemma 3: Let the weight of each IDS incapable insider
node be a real number greater than the sum of the weights
of the IDS capable insider nodes. Then, any IDS capable
minimum weighted dominating set in G′ becomes a minimum
weighted dominating set in G′ and vice versa.
Now, the optimal set of IDS active nodes forms a minimum
weighted dominating set in G′. It is well-known that com-
puting a minimum weighted dominating set is an NP-hard
problem [10]. This motivates the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Optimally selecting the IDS active nodes is an
NP-hard problem.
We present a distributed approximation algorithm for se-
lecting the IDS active nodes based on the LP relaxation
technique proposed by Kuhn et al. [14], and improve upon
their approximation ratio.
Let N ′i be the neighborhood set in G′ of an insider node
i ∈ V ′. For each i ∈ V ′, we consider a variable xi that is
either 1 or 0. Consider a set Vd that consists of insider nodes
i for which xi = 1. Now, Vd is a dominating set in G′ if and
only if
∑
j∈N ′
i
xj ≥ 1 ∀ i ∈ V ′. Thus the computation of a
minimum weighted dominating set in G′ can be formulated
as the following integer linear program, which we refer to as
“minimizing resource dominating set (MRDOMIP).”
(MRDOMIP) Minimize :
∑
i∈V ′ wixi
subject to ∀ i ∈ V ′
1) ∑j∈N ′
i
xj ≥ 1,
2) xi ∈ {0, 1}.
By relaxing the integer constraints, we obtain the following
linear program.
(MRDOMLP) Minimize:
∑
i∈V ′ wixi
subject to ∀ i ∈ V ′
1) ∑j∈N ′
i
xj ≥ 1,
2) 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1.
Note that MRDOMIP and MRDOMLP are centralized
optimization problems. But, we solve MRDOMLP optimally
using the following distributed iterative approach. Each insider
node i in V ′ maintains the following variables: (a) node
indicator ψi, (b) weight wi and (c) xi. Variables ψi and xi
are updated in every iteration; their values in the nth iteration
are ψni and xni . Removal nodes (i.e., nodes in V \ V ′) do
not participate in the computation or message exchange. We
assume that each insider node knows whether any of its
neighbors is IDS capable, and can therefore determine whether
it is in V ′.
Let γ be a constant greater than 1. An insider node i ∈ V ′
updates ψi and xi as follows.
ψni =
{
0 if
∑
j∈N ′
i
xnj ≥ 1
1 if otherwise.
xn+1i = [x
n
i − 1n (wi − γ
∑
j∈N ′
i
ψj)]+ ∀i ∈ [1, n].
Here, x+ = max(x, 0). We now explain the intuition behind
this iterative procedure. Each i ∈ V ′ updates xi using the node
indicators ψj from all its neighbors j ∈ G′. The goal of the
update in each iteration n is to obtain the smallest possible
value of xi for each node i such that for each of i’s neighbors
j,
∑
k∈N ′
j
xnk ≥ 1. If the above constraints are satisfied in
the nth iteration, then each such neighbor j’s node indicator
ψnj equals 0. Thus,
∑
j∈N ′
i
ψnj = 0. Hence, the algorithm
reduces xni by wi/n. When
∑
j∈N ′
i
ψj > 0, the constraint∑
k∈N ′
j
xnk ≥ 1 is violated at some j in N ′i . Hence, i increases
xi so that the constraint will be satisfied at j.
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In each iteration n, each insider node i ∈ V ′ broadcasts the
values xni and ψni in its neighborhood. The information can
be piggy-backed in the data or acknowledgement packets.
Theorem 1: For all γ > 1, irrespective of the values of x0
and ψ0, as n → ∞, xn converges to an optimal solution of
the linear program MRDOMLP .
Now, we describe how to obtain a dominating set using
the optimal solution xi of the linear program MRDOMLP .
Each i ∈ V ′ computes the maximum degree δ(2)i among all
nodes in V ′ at distance at most 2 from itself. Consider a set
D which is initially empty. Then i joins D with probability
min{1, xi ln(δ(2)i +1)}. Each i informs its neighbors whether it
is joining D. If none of i’s neighbors have joined D, it invites
a neighbor j that has the smallest weight wj in N ′i to join D.
Recall that by definition a node is its neighbor. When a node
j receives an invitation message from one of its neighbors, it
joins D. The resulting set D is a dominating set.
Theorem 2: The set D is an IDS capable dominating set. Its
expected weight (resource consumption) is at most O(log∆)
times that of the IDS capable minimum weight dominating set
in G′, where ∆ = maxi∈V ′ |N ′i |.
C. Selecting the IDS active nodes for maximizing the detection
efficiency subject to bounded resource consumption
Now we assume that the network wishes to limit the
resource consumed for detecting intrusion, and subject to this
aspires to maximize the detection efficiency. This happens
when the network reserves a part of its resources for other
functions. Specifically, we assume that the IDS active nodes
must be selected such that they cover the maximum possible
number of insider nodes subject to constraining the total
weight of the IDS active set to be less than a constant, L,
which is a system parameter. This goal is the dual of mini-
mizing the resource consumed for maximizing the detection
which we considered in subsection III-B.
Theorem 3: The selection of IDS active nodes so as to
maximize the number of insider nodes they cover subject to
constraining the total weight of the IDS active nodes to be
less than a given constant is an NP-hard problem.
We now outline the design of a distributed algorithm that
approximately computes the optimal set of IDS active nodes.
For this, we first formulate the problem as an integer linear
program, which we refer to as “maximizing detection dominat-
ing set (MDDOMIP).” Now, for each insider node i ∈ V ′ there
exists two integer variables: (a) xi and (b) yi. Now, xi indicates
whether an IDS active node covers i, i.e., xi = 1 if an insider
node in N ′i is IDS active, and 0 otherwise. Also, yi = 1 if i is
IDS active, and 0 otherwise. Thus, xi = min(1,
∑
j∈N ′
i
yj).
Thus, since each yj is a non-negative integer, xi is either 0
or 1. The upper bound on resource consumption introduces
another constraint:
∑
j∈V ′ wjyj ≤ L. The goal of MDDOMIP
is to maximize the number of nodes covered by the IDS
active nodes, i.e.,
∑
j∈V ′ xj subject to these constraints. We
would also like to minimize the resource consumption subject
to attaining the above goal. This is captured when the goal
a
r
v
v
v
2
4
53
3v
v1
r
Fig. 3. This figure illustrates the operation of GO-DOM. The circles in solid
lines are some of those that cover the geographic area of the network. For the
current positions of the nodes, 2 nodes in circle 3, v2, v5, execute the IDS.
Both v2 and v5 are the nearest in their neighborhoods to the center a of the
circle they reside in, i.e., circle 3. Now, v1 does not execute IDS as v2 in
v1’s neighborhood (the dashed circle) is nearer to a than v1.
of MDDOMIP is to maximize
∑
j∈V ′
(
xj − wj∑
j∈V ′ wj
yj
)
.
Note that the coefficient of each negative term in the objective
is small enough such that MDDOMIP tries to minimize the
sum of the negative terms only subject to maximizing the
positive terms.
(MDDOMIP) Maximize:
∑
j∈V ′
(
xj − wj∑
j∈V ′ wj
yj
)
subject to
1) xi ≤
∑
j∈N ′
i
yj , ∀ i ∈ V ′,
2) xi ≤ 1, ∀ i ∈ V ′,
3) yi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i ∈ V ′,
4) ∑j∈V ′ wjyj ≤ L.
The next step will be to relax the integer constraints for
yi, i.e, replace constraint (3) by 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ V ′ in
MDDOMIP. As in the previous subsection, the resulting linear
program (LP) can be solved in a distributed manner, and the
IDS active set can be constructed from the optimal solution
of the LP. We omit the details due to page constraints.
Finally, the optimal solution of MRDOMIP can be ob-
tained by using L =
∑
i∈V ′ wi in MDDOMIP. Therefore,
MRDOMIP is a special case of MDDOMIP.
D. Robust heuristic algorithms for selecting the IDS active
node when insider nodes move
The algorithms presented so far are oblivious to the position
of outsider nodes, and are therefore not affected by their
movements. But, the IDS active set must be recomputed each
time an insider node’s neighborhood changes due to its or
its neighbors’ movements. The computations and the related
message exchanges consume significant resources particularly
when they are executed frequently, i.e., when the insider nodes
move rapidly. We now present computationally simple algo-
rithms that do not require any re-computation with movement
of either insider or outsider nodes, and require only limited
message exchange when insider nodes move. The disadvantage
is that we have not been able to prove any approximation
bound for any of these algorithms. We evaluate them using
simulation.
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First, we consider a naive algorithm (RP) in which every
IDS capable insider node executes the IDS with a probability
which can be selected so as to regulate the resource consumed
and detection rate. For example, if this probability is high, then
a large number of nodes are IDS active. Thus, the detection
consumes a lot of resource but most malicious packets are
detected.
We now propose another heuristic, which we refer to as
GO-DOM (geometric dominating set algorithm), that uses ge-
ometric information to select the IDS active nodes (Figure 3).
The network is covered by the minimum possible number of
circles each with radius r, where r is the transmission range
of a node. The center of the outer most circle has a distance r
from the closest network boundary. Each IDS capable insider
node knows or computes the coordinate of the centers of the
circles. Note that this is a one time computation or message
exchange for each IDS capable insider node. We assume that
each insider node knows its neighbors’ coordinates by using
GPS or other techniques e.g., [5]. An insider node selects an
IDS capable neighbor which is the nearest to the center of
a circle it currently resides in to execute the IDS (an insider
node may select itself as well since by definition it is its own
neighbor). For this, each IDS capable insider node broadcasts
its distance from the center of each circle it resides in to its
neighbors. It sends this broadcast packet when it joins the
system, and thereafter each time it moves.
GO-DOM detects all malicious packets as it selects the
IDS active nodes so as to cover the entire network. We now
generalize GO-DOM so as to select fewer IDS active nodes
at the expense of obtaining lower detection rates. Now, each
node selected by GO-DOM decides whether to execute the
IDS with a probability p which can be selected so as to
regulate the resource consumed and detection rate. We refer to
this version as generalized geometric dominating set algorithm
(GGO-DOM).
In the next section, we compare the performances of the
heuristics with the approximation algorithms, and determine
when each may be deployed.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Using ns2-simulations, we compare the performance of the
proposed approximation algorithms with the computationally
simple heuristics. This comparison allows us to evaluate the
benefits of (approximately) optimally selecting the IDS active
nodes, and accordingly decide the appropriate algorithm for
any desired tradeoff between detection efficiency and resource
consumption. We do not present performance comparisons of
the approximation and the optimal algorithms, since the opti-
mal algorithms are computationally intensive and the optimal
selections are NP-hard problems. But sample computations
suggest that the approximation algorithms closely approximate
the optimal algorithm, and in most cases the performance
difference is much less than the upper bound guaranteed in
Theorem 2.
We present averages of measurements for 200 different
random topologies with nodes uniformly distributed in a
square of side 670m. We simulate each topology for 200
seconds, and consider two different scenarios: (a) a single
intruder launching an attack consisting of 5 packets and (b)
5 intruders colluding to launch an attack consisting of 10
packets. In (b) all intruders together send 10 malicious packets
and in this sense they collude. In all cases, the intruders
are selected randomly, and attack a single randomly selected
outsider node. The route between the intruders and outsiders
consist of multiple hops. For both (a) and (b) we again
consider networks with (i) different number of insider nodes,
e.g., 50 and 100, (ii) different transmission radii 250m and
150m, (iii) different routing protocols, e.g., AODV, DSR and
(iv) different node mobility, e.g., mobile intruders and static
insider nodes, mobile intruders and mobile insider nodes etc.
Each mobile node moves as per the random way point mobility
model with speed of 20 m/s and pause time 10 sec.
A malicious packet is analyzed and hence detected by an
IDS active node if it is relayed by at least one neighbor of
the node. The percentage detection rate is the percentage of
the trials in which all malicious packets are detected. The
total number of packets analyzed by the IDS active nodes
in the system (detection cost) is a measure of the resource
consumed in the detection process. This measure is related to
the number of IDS active nodes, which we have considered
in the mathematical formulation. We evaluate the detection
cost using simulation as it depends not just on the selection
of the IDS active nodes but also on the routing. For different
algorithms, we plot (a) the ratio of their expected detection
costs as a function of the percentage detection rate, and (b) the
percentage detection rate as a function of the number of IDS
active insider nodes. These plots will help us understand the
tradeoff between detection efficiency and resource consumed
in the detection process.
We now digress to explain why a packet may be analyzed
by multiple IDS active nodes. First, a design objective is that
each packet is analyzed by one IDS active node. But, this
is generally not possible in practice. Since packets need not
traverse the IDS active nodes that analyze them (the IDS active
nodes can analyze the packets they observe due to promiscuous
operation), they can not alter packets so as to indicate whether
the packets have been analyzed. But, whenever an IDS active
node l analyzes a packet p it can communicate a short message
to a node m further along in p′s path. If l finds p to be
malicious, this message would instruct m to drop p; otherwise
the message would instruct m to add an HMAC (message
authentication code) [2] in p’s header. Now, any other IDS
active node n that receive p, (either through promiscuous
reception or because p traverses n) checks if the HMAC value
in p’s header exists and matches the calculated value. If so, n
need not analyze p. Otherwise, n can analyze p. But, if p is a
good packet, in either case, n needs to process p (e.g., examine
the HMAC etc.). Thus, good packets are likely to be processed
several times by IDS active nodes. Note that most packets are
good except when the attacks are worm-based [16], e.g., in our
simulations outsiders transmit at most 10 malicious packets in
200 seconds.
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(b) 50 nodes, r = 250 m
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Fig. 4. We plot the ratio of the expected detection costs of RP and DOM, and GGO-DOM and DOM as a function of the percentage detection rate. We
consider topologies where a mobile intruder attacks a single destination. The insider nodes are static. In figures (a) and (b), we consider both AODV and
DSR routing protocols, transmission range (r) as 250m, and topologies with 100 and 50 insider nodes respectively. In figure (c), we consider AODV routing
protocol, r = 150, and topologies with 100 and 50 insider nodes.
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(b) 50 nodes, r = 250 m
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(d) 100 nodes, r = 150 m
Fig. 5. We plot the ratio of the expected detection costs of RP and DOM and GGO-DOM and DOM as a function of the percentage detection rate. We
consider topologies with 5 mobile intruders colluding to attack a single destination. The insider nodes are static. In figures (a) and (b), we consider both
AODV and DSR routing protocols, transmission range (r) as 250m, and topologies with 100 and 50 insider nodes respectively. In figure (c), we consider
AODV routing protocol, r = 150m, and topologies with 100 and 50 insider nodes. In figure (d), we only consider detection rates greater than 90%.
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(c) AODV, r = 150 m
Fig. 6. We plot the ratio of the expected detection costs of RP and GGO-DOM as a function of the percentage detection rate. We consider topologies with
5 mobile intruders colluding to attack a single destination. The insider nodes are mobile. In figures (a) and (b), we consider both AODV and DSR routing
protocols, transmission range (r) as 250m, and topologies with 100 and 50 insider nodes respectively. In figure (c), we consider AODV routing protocol,
transmission range (r) as 150m, and topologies with 100 and 50 insider nodes.
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Fig. 7. We plot the percentage detection rates of DOM and GGO-DOM as function of the percentage of nodes executing the IDS. We consider topologies
with 5 mobile intruders colluding to attack a single destination. In figures (a) and (b), we consider both AODV and DSR routing protocols, transmission range
(r) as 250m, and topologies with 100 and 50 insider nodes respectively. In figure (c), we consider AODV routing protocol, r = 150m, and topologies with
100 and 50 insider nodes.
We first assume that insider nodes are static, and evaluate the
performance of the approximation algorithms (subsections III-
B and III-C) and the heuristics RP, GGO-DOM (subsection III-
D). We assume that each insider node is IDS capable and
has unit weight. We consider the maximum number of insider
nodes that can be IDS active as a system parameter, and
obtain approximate solutions of MDDOMIP with L equaling
different values of this parameter (subsection III-C). (Since
MRDOMIP is a special case of MDDOMIP, we only consider
MDDOMIP here.) We refer to this solution as “DOM” in the
figures. In RP and GGO-DOM, we select the probability of
executing the IDS at each node such that the expected number
of IDS active nodes equals the above system parameter. Using
ns2-simulations, for each value of this parameter, we measure
the expected detection costs and the percentage detection rates
when the system selects the IDS active nodes as per DOM,
GGO-DOM and RP in 200 topologies with static insiders and
(a) a single mobile intruder launching an attack consisting of
5 packets on a single destination (figure 4) and (b) 5 mobile
intruders colluding to launch an attack consisting of 10 packets
on a single destination (figure 5). We plot the ratio between
the expected detection costs of RP and DOM, and GGO-
DOM and DOM as a function of the percentage detection
rate in these figures. The simulations show that the same
algorithm performs similarly for AODV and DSR. But, the
performances of different algorithms can be quite different. For
high detection rates, RP has significantly higher detection cost
than DOM, and GGO-DOM has somewhat higher detection
cost than DOM. But for low detection rates, RP, GGO-DOM
and DOM have similar detection costs. The difference between
the expected detection costs of GGO-DOM and DOM become
noticeable only for very high detection rates (e.g., > 95%).
Thus, given its low detection cost, DOM is a clear choice
when systems require very high detection rates (e.g., > 95%).
Given its simplicity, RP is a clear choice for systems that
can accept low detection rates. GGO-DOM has intermediate
computation and message exchange requirements, and should
be used for medium to high detection rates. The thresholds for
these “low, medium, high” detection rates can be decided on
a case by case basis.
We now explain the observations for DOM and RP. For both
DOM and RP, the detection cost and detection rate increase
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with increase in the number of IDS active nodes, but by
different amounts for different detection rates. For both DOM
and RP, the detection costs increase by equal amounts for equal
increase in the number of IDS active nodes irrespective of
the current value of the detection rate. Now, for DOM the
total area covered by the IDS active nodes, and hence the
detection rate increase by equal amounts for equal increase
in the number of IDS active nodes irrespective of the current
value of the detection rate. This is because DOM selects the
IDS active nodes such that their coverage areas minimally
overlap. This however does not hold for RP. Recall that RP
selects the IDS active nodes uniformly in the entire set of
insider nodes. Since in the simulations the insider nodes are
uniformly distributed in a square, this is equivalent to selecting
the IDS active nodes such that they are uniformly distributed
in the square as well. When RP has a low detection rate,
its IDS active nodes cover a small area. Now, since the IDS
active nodes are uniformly distributed under RP and since the
uncovered area is more than the covered area, a new IDS
active node is more likely to be selected in the uncovered
area. Thus, for low detection rates, similar to DOM, RP selects
the IDS active nodes such that their coverage areas minimally
overlap. Therefore, RP and DOM have similar increase in the
coverage area and hence detection rates for the same increase
in the number of IDS active nodes at this stage. Now, as
argued before, both RP and DOM have similar increase in the
detection costs for the same increase in the number of IDS
active nodes. Thus, at low detection rates, RP and DOM have
similar increase in the detection cost for the same increase
in the detection rate. When RP has a high detection rate, its
IDS active nodes together cover a large area. Now, since the
IDS active nodes are uniformly distributed under RP and since
the covered area is more than the uncovered area, a new IDS
active node is more likely to be selected in the covered area.
Thus, for high detection rates, unlike DOM, RP selects the
IDS active nodes such that their coverage areas significantly
overlap. Therefore, compared to DOM, RP has much smaller
increase in coverage area and hence detection rates for the
same increase in the number of IDS active nodes at this
stage. Conversely, at high detection rates, for equal increase in
detection rates, compared to DOM, RP needs to execute the
IDS in many more nodes, which leads to higher increase in
the detection cost. Thus, at high detection rates, RP has much
larger increase in the detection cost for the same increase in
the detection rate.
GGO-DOM and DOM select the IDS active nodes from
those selected by GO-DOM and the approximate solution
of MDDOMIP respectively. The latter ensures less overlap
among the coverage areas of the selected nodes than GO-DOM
which does not have a provable approximation bound. Thus,
GGO-DOM consumes some more resource than DOM.
Now, we consider mobile insider nodes, and compare the
performance of GGO-DOM and RP (subsection III-D). Recall
that the approximate solutions of MRDOMIP (subsection III-
B) and MDDOMIP (subsection III-C) can not be used in this
case as the solutions must be recomputed every time an insider
node moves. We select the probabilities in GGO-DOM and
RP just as for the static insider case. We consider topologies
where 5 mobile intruders collude to launch an attack consisting
of 10 packets on a single destination. We plot the ratio between
the expected detection costs of RP and GGO-DOM as a
function of the percentage detection rate in figure 6. The plots
are similar to those for networks with static insiders, except
that the difference between the resource consumption of RP
and GGO-DOM is little lower than that between RP and DOM.
We draw similar conclusions.
We now investigate the number of IDS active nodes selected
by DOM and GGO-DOM for high detection rates. In figure 7
we plot the percentage detection rates of these algorithms as
function of the expected number of IDS active nodes. We
consider topologies with static insiders, and 5 mobile intruders
launching an attack consisting of 10 malicious packets on
a destination node. The figures show that both algorithms
attain 90% and 100% detection rates when only 8% and
15% of the insider nodes execute the IDS respectively. Thus,
high detection rates are obtained even when only a small
fraction of the insider nodes operate in promiscuous mode.
In most adhoc networks, at least a small number of nodes
have significant energy. Thus, even for high detection rates, it
would be sufficient to execute the IDS only in these nodes.
Finally, we comment on an approximation in the analytical
model. Strictly speaking, all malicious packets need not be
detected when the IDS active nodes constitute a dominating
set in G′. Consider the following example adhoc network
with 3 insider nodes A,B,C. All nodes are IDS capable.
Hence, G and G′ are the same. Let both A and C be B’s
neighbors. But, A and C are not each others neighbors. Let
B, which constitutes the dominating set, execute the IDS. If
A and C simultaneously relay malicious packets to outsider
nodes, the packets collide at B, and therefore escape detection.
Since the intruders transmit malicious packets only rarely,
such simultaneous transmissions are rare, and have never
occurred in our extensive simulations. Therefore, we have not
considered them in the analysis.
V. RELATED WORK
Ko et al. describe the challenges faced by conventional
intrusion detection mechanisms when used in adhoc networks
[13]. Misuse intrusion detection has been extensively investi-
gated [3], [9]. We focus on the design tradeoffs involved in
selecting the nodes that detect intrusion, rather than proposing
or analyzing any misuse detection algorithm.
We now describe some related work in placing the detection
modules. Ramanujam et al. [20] advocate the use of firewalls
on every node with the firewalls being configured to contain
the list of allowable packet flows. Like us, they require
intermediate nodes to eavesdrop passively. Zhang et al. [25]
also present a distributed intrusion detection and response
framework for MANETs, where every node executes the IDS
and responds to intrusion. Like us, they assume that the nodes
cooperate. The disadvantage of both these schemes is that they
consume significant energy and computational resource due
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to involvement of every node in the detection scheme. We
present algorithms that maximize the detection performance
while minimizing the resource consumption.
Kachirski et al. [12] describe a mobile agent based detection
system for ad hoc networks based on anomaly detection tech-
nique. Here, only few nodes monitor the network traffic. These
nodes are selected based on a voting scheme that considers
the connectivity of the nodes. The authors only describe
the architecture and propose to do more work to discover
better detection algorithms and improve the robustness of the
algorithm for selecting the monitoring nodes. Thus, the work
seems to be in its infancy, though the basic idea is novel.
We now briefly describe a few other detection schemes that
do not consider placement of IDS. Marti et al. [15] propose a
cooperative routing scheme for avoiding transmitting packets
through misbehaving nodes. Nodes promiscuously monitor
traffic and cooperate so as to detect and report misbehavior
to other nodes. Michiardi et al. [17] present the CORE
mechanism in which reputation is used to enforce cooperation
among nodes and prevent denial of service attacks. Buchegger
et al. [22] propose the CONFIDANT scheme in which a node
monitors its neighborhood to detect intrusion. When a node
detects intrusion, it transmits alarm messages to other nodes
in its friends list. Rao et al. [21] propose to detect intruders by
observing node behavior. The idea is to estimate the congestion
at intermediate nodes and decide if the intermediate node is not
forwarding packets at the desired rate because of congestion
or because of malicious behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
We investigate the placement of the intrusion detection
software for misuse detection in adhoc networks with multiple,
mobile colluding intruders. Our goal is to maximize the detec-
tion performance while using limited computational resources.
We mathematically formulate the problems of minimizing
the resource consumption subject to attaining the maximum
possible detection, and maximizing the detection subject to
consuming no more than a certain amount of resource. We
show that computing the optimal solution is NP-hard in each
case. Thereafter, we propose algorithms that approximate the
optimal solutions, and prove that these algorithms have guaran-
teeable approximation ratio. We demonstrate using simulation
that these algorithms consume much less resource for attaining
the same detection rate as compared to naive algorithms
that randomly place the IDS. Our simulations also reveal
that even for high detection rates (90 − 100%), the optimal
selection algorithms require only a small fraction of nodes
to execute the IDS, which can therefore be those that are not
limited in energy. Our investigation will be useful in designing
intrusion detection systems, and evaluating the efficacy of
misuse detection, which is widely used in wireline networks,
in adhoc networks. Promising areas of future research are the
design of efficient intrusion recovery mechanisms, protocols
for cooperation among insider nodes that execute the IDS
and schemes to detect attacks when the insider nodes are
compromised.
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